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Abstract In the course of the ongoing digitalization of
production, production environments have become
increasingly intertwined with information and communication technology. As a consequence, physical production
processes depend more and more on the availability of
information networks. Threats such as attacks and errors
can compromise the components of information networks.
Due to the numerous interconnections, these threats can
cause cascading failures and even cause entire smart factories to fail due to propagation effects. The resulting

Accepted after three revisions by Jan Mendling.

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this
article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s12599-019-00610-6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
D. Miehle
Technical University of Munich, Boltzmannstraße 3,
85748 Garching bei München, Germany
e-mail: daniel.miehle@tum.de
B. Häckel
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complex dependencies between physical production processes and information network components in smart factories complicate the detection and analysis of threats.
Based on generalized stochastic Petri nets, the paper presents an approach that enables the modeling, simulation,
and analysis of threats in information networks in the area
of connected production environments. Different worstcase threat scenarios regarding their impact on the operational capability of a close-to-reality information network
are investigated to demonstrate the feasibility and usability
of the approach. Furthermore, expert interviews with an
academic Petri net expert and two global leading companies from the automation and packaging industry complement the evaluation from a practical perspective. The
results indicate that the developed artifact offers a
promising approach to better analyze and understand
availability risks, cascading failures, and propagation
effects in information networks in connected production
environments.
Keywords Smart factory  Information network 
Information network analysis  IT availability risks  Petri
nets

1 Introduction
A recent worldwide survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC) among 2000 participants from nine major industrial
sectors and 26 countries showed that 54% of the participants considered business interruptions due to cyber-security breaches the main challenge for smart factories
(PwC 2016a). Thereby, in contrast to traditional factories,
smart factories enhance production systems through horizontal and vertical integration of information systems
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representing a central characteristic of the Industry 4.0
vision (Acatech 2013). In this context, additional IT
availability risks arise from digitalization and interconnection of production (Amin et al. 2013). As production
infrastructures in smart factories become increasingly
intertwined with information and communication technology (ICT), the operational capability of smart factories
increasingly depends on the high availability of information systems (Lucke et al. 2008). Thereby, concepts such as
the Internet of Things (IoT) and Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPS) intensify the digital interconnection of production
via intra- and inter-organizational information networks
(Acatech 2013).
On the one hand, the comprehensive interconnection
and resulting real-time availability of information enable
innovative production principles and business models
offering extensive advantages (e.g., increased flexibility
and efficiency of production) (Iansiti and Lakhani 2014).
On the other hand, however, highly interconnected smart
factories are becoming more vulnerable to IT availability
risks (e.g., due to the removal of protective air gaps or
interconnection of production and office environments)
(Smith et al. 2007; Amiri et al. 2014; Smith et al. 2007).
Moreover, the integration of Internet-based applications
(e.g., cloud computing) and the growing collaboration with
value chain partners (customers or vendors) reinforce this
threat potential due to the growing number of possible
access points for malicious cyber-attacks (Smith et al.
2007; Yoon et al. 2012). This was also found by the study
of PwC as the number of cyber-attacks on businesses rose
by 38% in 2015 (PwC 2016b). Consequently, companies
face the challenge to cope with this increased threat
potential. In addition to intentional attacks, unintentional
errors (e.g., technical defects or human errors) can heavily
compromise the availability of information networks
directly and indirectly.
As physical production processes in smart factories are
highly dependent on the underlying information network,
threats can affect the operational capability of both information and production networks (Broy et al. 2012). In
addition, threats now also include the propagation of
locally occurring interruptions within interconnected
information and production networks even without physical connections (Smith et al. 2007). Thus, informational
dependencies that arise from the increasing interconnection
and use of real-time information are becoming more
important. Moreover, information-based systemic risks that
may spread across smart factory boundaries in interconnected digitalized networks are also identified as one of the
most important challenges in the field of computer science
and business informatics, where they are known as the
‘‘grand challenges’’ (Buhl and Penzel 2010; Mertens and
Barbian 2015). Accordingly, IT availability risks have
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become one of the most important threats in smart factories
(Amiri et al. 2014).
This has also been shown by numerous incidents. One
well-known example is the Stuxnet worm, which infected
the industrial control system of a nuclear power plant in
Iran in 2011 (The New York Times 2011). Today, attacks
can heavily impede the production of a factory and are a
threat of upmost relevance as e.g., 70% of the companies of
a recent study state that they were attacked within the last
two years (BSI 2017). The same study revealed that every
second successful attack causes production downtimes or a
loss of operations. In this context, the locky or WannaCry
ransomware (e.g., Merkur 2018) is another impressive
example, how intentional attacks can spread within a
company, even when starting at only one weak point.
Thereby, the weak point does not have to be directly
connected to production components, as, for instance,
malicious attackers targeted the industrial control system of
a steel mill via the office network to compromise the
operation of blast furnaces in 2014 (BSI 2014). Moreover,
errors can lead to far-reaching disturbances: for instance,
an incorrect software update forced a nuclear power plant
into an emergency shutdown for 48 h in the US in 2008
(Washington Post 2008) and a technical defect of a single
hard disk resulted in a server shutdown for 19 h in three
clinics in Germany (BSI 2016).
Considering the technical developments and described
threat scenarios, companies face the challenge of dealing
with increasingly complex information networks regarding
IT availability risk and their inherent dependency structures.
Thereby, especially the dynamic behavior including cascading failures and stochastic propagation effects are of
critical importance as single point failures can spread in the
entire network and cause severe damage in the smart factory,
e.g., in terms of production downtime and economic damage. Accordingly, companies are confronted with new
challenges regarding a comprehensive risk management.
Thereby, companies have to go through the four phases of
risk management including (1) identification, (2) quantification, (3) control, and (4) monitoring (Hallikas et al. 2004).
For this, companies require appropriate methods for the
modeling and simulation of such information networks (Lasi
et al. 2014) capturing the peculiarities of information networks in smart factories as a first step. As necessary concepts
for an appropriate modeling of information networks do not
exist so far, we state the following research question.
RQ

How can the information network of a smart factory
be modeled to depict and simulate IT availability
risks?

Following the design science research (DSR) approach
(Hevner et al. 2004), we introduce a stochastic Petri net
approach, which enables a structured depiction of
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information networks in smart factories. This allows the
analysis of IT availability risks and the identification of
weak spots within the information network. Our approach
depicts the structure of information networks by modeling
single components and informational dependencies
between them. Hence, our approach facilitates the riskoriented analysis of single components as well as of the
whole information network. Further, it enables the simulation and analysis how different patterns of information
networks are affected by certain threat scenarios and how
propagation effects occur and spread in different patterns
(e.g., the security level of components). For example, with
regard to the mentioned examples, our approach could have
been used preventively to model, simulate, and analyze the
information network in the course of risk management. On
this basis, weak points for attacks and critical dependencies
would have become apparent, for which targeted security
measures could then have been taken. Although this would
not have made a 100% protection possible, a reduction of
risk, for example by reducing the probability of a successful attack, would have been possible. This is particularly important in smart factories, as the vulnerability of
smart factories increases significantly due to the increasing
dependency relations within the information network.
Following the publication schema suggested by Gregor
and Hevner (2013), this paper is organized as follows. In
the next section, we provide an overview of related work
regarding smart factories and IT availability risks. Based
on the literature, we derive design objectives and requirements for an appropriate modeling approach. In Sect. 3, we
specify Petri nets (PN) as the modeling language used in
our approach. Section 4 describes our modeling approach
as one essential artifact of our research. In Sect. 5, we
evaluate our modeling approach by performing a feature
comparison and demonstrating the applicability and feasibility of our artifact by simulating an exemplary information network based on a real-world setting. Further, to
complement the evaluation from a naturalistic perspective,
we integrate the insights of interviews with two experts
from global leading companies in the robotic automation
and packaging industry, and an academic PN expert.
Finally, in Sect. 6, we discuss the results and limitations of
our research and provide an outlook on future research.

2 Theoretical Background and Design Objectives
In this section, we review current literature on smart factories and categorize IT availability risks and threats in
smart factories. Based on the literature, we define design
objectives (DO) to lay the foundation for the development
of our artifact in correspondence with our research
question.
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2.1 Smart Factories
The investigated body of literature comprises infrastructural aspects (Lucke et al. 2008; Yoon et al. 2012; Zuehlke
2010; Colombo and Karnouskos 2009), characteristics
(Brettel et al. 2014; Radziwon et al. 2014; Schuh et al.
2014), as well as challenges (Amin et al. 2013; Broy et al.
2012; Cardenas et al. 2009; Sridhar et al. 2012; Sadeghi
et al. (nd)) regarding smart factories. Although widely used
in literature and practice (Radziwon et al. 2014), there is no
common definition of the term smart factory, so far. Based
on the analysis of different definitions, Radziwon et al.
(2014) define the smart factory as a ‘‘manufacturing solution that provides such flexible and adaptive production
processes that will solve problems arising on a production
facility […].’’ Hermann et al. (2015) define the smart factory as a ‘‘factory where CPS communicate over the IoT
and assist people and machines in the execution of their
tasks’’ and describe, that ‘‘within the modular structured
Smart Factories […], CPS monitor physical processes,
create a virtual copy of the physical world and make
decentralized decisions’’. And adopting the idea of IoT,
Zuehlke (2010) describes a smart factory that is composed
of smart objects that are able to ‘‘self-organize to fulfil a
certain task’’ by interacting with each other via wireless
communication infrastructures. These definitions reflect the
specific characteristics of smart factories, such as their
modular and decentralized design, which enables functionalities like production flexibility, reconfigurability, and
adaptability and that distinguish a smart factory from a
conventional factory (Brettel et al. 2014; Radziwon et al.
2014; Zuehlke 2010).
In contrast to traditional factories, smart factories
enhance manufacturing systems through horizontal and
vertical integration representing a fundamental characteristic of the industry 4.0 vision (Acatech 2013). Horizontal
integration refers to the integration of IT systems across
value chains both within a company and between several
different companies. This results in the creation of new
internal and external connections for data analysis or supply chain operations as well as the abandoning of air gaps.
Vertical integration refers to the integration of IT systems
across the different levels of the automation pyramid (cf.
Fig. 1). Through the integration of production-oriented
CPSs, so called Cyber-Physical Production Systems
(CPPSs), the levels of the automation pyramid (i.e., field to
business level) gradually vanish and are replaced by networked and decentrally organized services (Brettel et al.
2014; Monostori 2014). CPPSs integrate computing and
communication capabilities in physical production environments realizing the fusion of the cyber and physical
world (Lee et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2016). Accordingly,
CPPSs are able to sense, monitor, and control physical
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Fig. 1 Vertical integration –
Decomposition of automation
hierarchy – own illustration
based on VDI (2013)
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production in an autonomous manner and interact with
each other in real-time (Brettel et al. 2014). Based on the
described characteristics in existing literature, we obtained
the following detailed structure of a smart factory as shown
in Fig. 2.
The structure of a smart factory comprises a physical
production environment and an information network. Following the definition of IT infrastructure (Weill and Vitale
2002), we characterize an information network in the
context of smart factories as a horizontally and vertically
integrated network of hardware, software, and service
components (i.e., information network components) supporting IT-enabled processes in the physical production
environment. The physical production environment consists of several production components (e.g., smart industrial robots, smart machines, and smart transport systems)
that perform one or multiple tasks and can be combined
flexibly according to the requirements of a product (Lasi
et al. 2014; Lucke et al. 2008). Production components are
equipped with a multitude of sensors and/or actuators that
are connected to programmable logic controller (PLC) as
well as to higher level IT services and data storages via the
information network (Lee et al. 2015; Lucke et al. 2008;
Zuehlke 2010). The information network seamlessly
S = Sensor
A = Actuator
PLC = Programmable

CPS-Based Automation
PLC:
SCADA:

programmable logic controller
supervisory control and data acquisition

connects so far separated information network components
within a company and across company borders enabling a
flexible and reconfigurable production (Lucke et al. 2008;
Yoon et al. 2012). Sensors and actuators translate signals
between the physical and cyber world. Thus, they can be
considered as bridge components that are part of both the
production environment and the information network (Hao
and Xie 2009). Thereby, sensors gather physical production
data (e.g., temperature, pressure) for tasks such as quality
management or predictive maintenance (e.g., checking oil
level). Actuators execute production tasks based on control
commands from PLCs (Lee et al. 2015; Zuehlke 2010).
PLCs ensure the self-control of certain tasks and the
exchange of relevant production data between machines
and between information network components such as IT
services (Lucke et al. 2008). IT services include applications such as enterprise resource planning (ERP) or manufacturing execution systems (MES). The server
infrastructure for IT services and data storage can either be
hosted on premise or in the cloud (Colombo and Karnouskos 2009; Yoon et al. 2012; Zuehlke 2010). Applications will increasingly be running in the cloud in the future.
In addition, there are numerous external interfaces to value
chain partners that are essential for the increased flexibility
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Fig. 2 Basic structure of a smart factory – own illustration based on Lucke et al. (2008) and Yoon et al. (2012)
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of the production system and the optimization of production processes extending the information network of a
smart factory (Broy et al. 2012; Acatech 2013). In conclusion, the information network consists of a multitude of
different types of information network components
increasing the overall complexity of production facilities.
For one thing, ‘‘a networked machine is more valuable
than isolated ones’’ and enables the creation of ‘‘autonomous and intelligent applications’’ (Wan et al. 2013).
At the same time, however, the increasing vertical and
horizontal integration of ICT and the growing importance
of real-time information in smart factories lead to information networks with complex and manifold informational
dependencies. Hence, a structured modeling approach is
required to provide transparency and to allow the identification of critical components and dependencies. Therefore,
the modeling approach should provide a formal representation to support companies with the analysis of information networks in smart factories. This enables a detailed,
simulation-based analysis and the comparability of different information network designs. Further, a graphical representation of the modeling approach would be beneficial
as it enables a transparent representation of the mode of
operation of a modeled information network component.
As information networks can be of different sizes in
dependence of the size of the overall production facility
(ranging from a few hundred components to several tens of
thousands components, e.g., Siemens Electronics Factory
in Amberg with [ 1.000 PLC components besides other IT
components (Siemens 2017)), the modeling approach
should be able to depict single components, subnetworks
(e.g., production cells), and entire smart factory networks.
Thereby, we understand scalability as the ability of our
modeling approach to handle an increasing number of
components. Against this background, we define the following design objectives.
DO:1

DO:2

Graphical and formal representation: To enable
the depiction and simulation-based analysis of IT
availability risks, the modeling approach has to
provide an appropriate formal and mathematical
representation of information networks in smart
factories and a graphic representation of the
modeling approach.
Scalability: To depict information networks of
different sizes and complexity, the modeling
approach should capture single components, subnetworks, and entire smart factory networks in a
scalable and comprehensible manner.
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2.2 IT Availability Risks and Threats in Smart
Factories
In this subsection, we describe IT availability risks in smart
factories. Following the definition of risk by Kaplan and
Garrick (1981), we differentiate between availability risks
and threats. Threats describe the source of availability
risks, whereas availability risks describe the effects, more
specifically the damage potential. Thus, a threat is an event
that can compromise components of information networks
and even cause the entire smart factory to fail (BSI 2016).
As shown in Fig. 3, threats in smart factories include both
intentional attacks and unintentional errors (Amin et al.
2013).
An attack is any intentional threat event that may result
in loss of the functionality of a component (Amin et al.
2013). According to the motivation of potential attackers,
the following types of attacks can be distinguished. Internal attacks (e.g., social engineering) are executed by
attackers from inside the organization (i.e., employees),
whereas external attacks (e.g., malware infections, attacks
on control components or Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks)
are executed by attackers from outside the organization
(e.g., cybercriminals) (Cardenas et al. 2009). Thereby,
production machines are an easy target for attackers as they
usually run custom and often obsolete software solutions
and, thus, are rather poorly secured. An error is any
unintentional threat event that may result in loss of the
functionality of a component (Amin et al. 2013). Errors can
be differentiated between technical errors (e.g., technical
defects), operator errors (e.g., erroneous entry of data),
and organizational errors (e.g., incorrect software update)
(Amin et al. 2013).
To better understand availability risks in smart factories
and their relations to threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures as well as reinforcers, we describe their relations
as depicted in Fig. 4.
As already mentioned, threats are defined as the source
of availability risks. By exploiting the vulnerabilities of a
component, threats can compromise directly and indirectly
specific components of the information network. The
resulting informational risks (e.g., availability issues, loss
of data) can be evaluated, for instance, by means of the
remaining availability of the information network. Countermeasures can reduce the vulnerabilities of components
and informational risks, for instance, to avert operational
interruptions. We adopt the idea of reinforcers introduced
by Keller and König (2014, p 6), which are caused mainly
by the underlying network structure. Thereby, reinforcers
(e.g., structural design, propagation effects) can increase
the vulnerabilities of components and availability risks.
Informational dependencies that arise from (1) the high
number of interconnected components and (2) the
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Fig. 3 Classification of threats in smart factories – own illustration
Fig. 4 Availability risk
relations in smart factories –
own illustration based on
Common Criteria (2006) and
Keller and König (2014)
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increasing use of real-time information reinforce in particular the vulnerabilities of components in smart factory
information networks.
Thereby, especially IoT and smart manufacturing technologies cause increased vulnerabilities and change
requirements on IT security in smart factories (Wengert
et al. 2016). Tupa et al. 2017 argue that ‘‘the connection of
cyber-space, sophisticated manufacturing of technologies
and elements, and using outsourcing of services [are] the
main factors increasing vulnerability’’ and that ‘‘the
implementation of Industry 4.0 has shown that the connections between humans, systems and objects have
become a more complex, dynamic and real-time optimized
network’’. Accordingly, ‘‘the concept of Industry 4.0 generates new categories of risks […] because of the increase
of vulnerabilities and threats’’ (Tupa et al. 2017). Consequently, all components of the information network are
critical as ‘‘industrial control systems are becoming the
target for malicious cyber intrusions’’ (Wengert et al.
2016). For example, SCADA systems, that were initially
designed to operate on closed networks, are increasingly
based on cloud technology resulting in increased interconnectivity and, ultimately, vulnerability (Eden et al.
2017). Thus, ‘‘the challenge to maintain availability will
increase as manufacturing evolves from a centralized
system supported by external suppliers to a distributed
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system in which production occurs closer to the point of
use’’ increasing potential points of failure (Wengert et al.
2016). Additionally, due to the highly interconnected
structure of information networks in smart factories, the
failure of a component can cause the failure of another
component resulting in cascading failures (Amin et al.
2013). These cascading failures reinforce the initial failure
and cause new threats that can lead to the loss of the
operational capability of the entire information network
(Danziger et al. 2016).
Despite the theoretical and practical relevance of cascading failures in smart factories, corresponding research
remains insufficient until today and do not address the
specific characteristics of information networks in smart
factories. For instance, Zambon et al. (2011) developed a
risk assessment method for business processes that considers the IT architecture and dependencies between IT
components. Sathanur and Haglin (2016) introduce a centrality measure that indicates the influences of each node
on the network by considering direct and indirect compromise through attack propagating. Amin et al. (2013)
provide a framework for assessing security risks that can be
caused by attacks or error based on a game-theoretic
approach. However, these approaches only allow a static
analysis and thus, neglect dynamic effects like cascading
failures within information networks. Other research
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analyses informational risks that exist in the context of
supply chain networks and critical infrastructures. For
instance, Wagner and Neshat (2010) develop an index to
evaluate the vulnerability of supply chain processes to
informational risks. However, they focus on a static analysis and do not explicitly consider propagation effects in
smart factories. In addition, they analyze the vulnerability
of the overall network and do not focus on the criticality of
single components. Since propagation effects are interdependent and dynamic, Buldyrev et al. (2010) consider the
spread of information risks within interdependent networks
analyzing the criticality of nodes for network stability.
Although this approach meets requirements like cascading
failures, it does not take into account the characteristics of
smart factory information networks like different component states. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, there is no
appropriate approach for the modeling of smart factory
information networks that considers adequately network
structures, inherent dependencies, and cascading failures.
Therefore, in our approach, we consider cascading
failures through two types of propagation effects, namely
deterministic (i.e., timing failure) and stochastic effects
(i.e., attack propagation). First, deterministic timing failures occur if a supporting component is not able to transmit
necessary information to other dependent components
within a specified time constraint. Second, after an attack
successfully compromised a component (e.g., the memory
of a production machine), the affected component can
compromise other connected components within the
information network, what we refer to as stochastic attack
propagation. Further, we consider the error of components
by means of stochastic time to error and the corresponding
recovery of failed components by means of stochastic time
to recovery that allows us to consider the resilience of
smart factories within the modeling approach and the
analysis of different security measures.
To determine whether an information network component is available and, thus, to determine the operational
capability of smart factories, possible states of a component
have to be defined (Arshad et al. 2006). Therefore, a component can exhibit only one state at a certain point in time in
our modeling approach. Thus, our modeling approach
considers time as discrete. For this, there is an absolute
clock that defines a time line consisting of equidistant points
in time. The time unit between two points in time can be
defined depending on the application. For example, it seems
reasonable to define it as 1 min in our application example
as we do not consider a hard real-time constraint. In case of
a hard real time constraint, for instance in case of critical
safety properties of a system, it could also be defined as a
millisecond or a second. Based on the described threats in
smart factories, the following states of a component result:
operational (OP), on hold (OH), failed after attack (FA),
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and failed after error (FE). As shown in Table 1, these
states and the resulting availability of a component, are
defined by two attributes: (1) function executable, which
indicates whether a component is technically able to execute its function; and (2) information accessible, which
indicates whether necessary information is accessible
within a given (real-time) constraint.
We consider a component to be operational if it can
execute its function and necessary information is accessible
on time. In contrast, a component is on hold if it is technically able to execute its function, but necessary information is not accessible punctually (e.g., due to the failure
of a supporting component). Further, attacks and errors can
affect the operational capability of a component. In this
case, a component is no longer able to execute its function
and hence, exchange information with other components.
In this case, it does not matter if necessary information is
accessible as the component is not able to execute its
function. According to the source of the failure, we distinguish between the states failed after attack and failed
after error. We assume that a component is available if it
exhibits the state s 2 fOPg and unavailable if it exhibits
one of the other states s 2 fOH; FA; FEg.
To apply appropriate countermeasures against IT
availability risks, companies need to determine the state of
each component. In particular, the resulting dynamic
behavior of information networks (i.e., state changes initiated by threats) is of upmost importance and has to be
captured. Thereby, both deterministic (e.g., timing failures)
and stochastic (e.g., attack propagation or time to error)
effects influence the dynamic behavior in different manners. For example, while deterministic timing failures
occur after a predictable time span of a component’s
unavailability, the propagation of an attack depends on the
underlying stochastic propagation probabilities. Hence, the
consideration of both deterministic and stochastic effects is
required. Therefore, we state the following design
objective.
DO:3

Threats: To enable the analysis and comparability
of different threats in smart factories, the modeling approach has to capture the characteristics of
different threats and corresponding propagation
effects.

2.3 Requirements for the Modeling Approach
Based on the described design objectives, we derive
requirements for an adequate modeling approach. These
have been discussed in the course of the conducted expert
interviews and were confirmed by the experts. The
requirements substantiate the design objectives and exemplify relevant characteristics that an adequate modeling

123

330

D. Miehle et al.: Modeling IT Availability Risks in Smart Factories, Bus Inf Syst Eng 62(4):323–345 (2020)

Table 1 Component states
State

Operational (OP)

On hold (OH)

Failed after attack (FA)

Failed after error (FE)

Function executable

Yes

Yes

No

No

Information accessible

Yes

No

Yes/no

Yes/no

Component available

Yes

No

No

No

approach has to exhibit. By means of the derived requirements, it is possible to evaluate the developed modeling
approach regarding its suitability to answer the stated
research question.
DO:1

Graphical and formal representation
R:1

R:2

DO:2

Scalability
R:3

DO:3

Graphical notation: To enable a visual and
comprehensible depiction of the operational
mode of the modeling approach, the modeling approach should provide a graphical
notation.
Mathematical definition: To enable the
simulation of information networks and
the analysis of failure propagation after
attacks and errors (e.g., calculation of ITILAvailability-Management-KPIs), the modeling approach should provide an exact
mathematical definition.

Modeling module: To enable the scalability
of the approach and the comprehensible
modeling of large information networks, the
modeling approach should be able to depict
an information network component as a
generic modeling module.

Threats
R:4

R:5

R:6
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Operational states: To enable the availability analysis of information networks, the
modeling approach has to capture the component states (see Table 1).
Dynamic behavior: To depict the dynamic
behavior of information networks, the modeling approach has to capture propagations
effects, i.e., the propagation of attacks and
timing failures, in discrete time steps.
Stochastic behavior: To depict the stochastic behavior of threats, the modeling
approach has to consider the probability of
a successful attack and its propagation as
well as exponentially distributed timing
aspects such as ‘‘time to error’’ and ‘‘time
to recovery’’ after an error of a component
occurs.

2.4 Methods for the Modeling and Analysis
of Networks
Despite its high theoretical and practical relevance,
research on the formal modeling of information networks
in smart factories remains insufficient. Accordingly, the
analysis and optimization of information networks
regarding IT availability risks remain major challenges. In
the following, we provide an overview of formal modeling
approaches dealing with networks that are subject to random failures, cascading failures, and exogenous shocks in
the context of supply chain and critical infrastructure networks as they may provide adequate starting points.
Graph theory represents a basis for the formal modeling
of networks. Here, each actor of a network is represented
by a node and dependencies between actors are represented
as edges between two nodes (Wagner and Neshat 2010).
For instance, Buldyrev et al. (2010), Faisal et al. (2007),
and Wagner and Neshat (2010) use graph theory to identify
and quantify risks in supply chains and critical infrastructure networks. Wagner and Neshat (2010) provide an index
to measure the vulnerability of supply chains and Faisal
et al. (2007) develop a framework to quantify information
risks in supply chains based on graph theory. However,
these approaches do not consider dynamic aspects and,
thus, are not appropriate for the analysis of propagation
effects in information networks of smart factories. In
contrast, Buldyrev et al. (2010) develop a framework that
considers the dynamics of cascading failures in interdependent networks. However, the approach only considers
functional and non-functional states of network actors and
neglects more detailed operational states. An extension of
the graph theory is the random graph developed by Erdös
and Rényi (1960)that combines graph theory and probability theory to analyze complex networks that are subject
to random failures (Albert et al. 2000; Ash and Newth
2007; Gao et al. 2012). However, random graph approaches do not allow the depiction of given real-world information network structures as nodes are connected
randomly (Gao et al. 2012). Altogether, the presented
approaches focus on the analysis of the overall network
and, hence, do not allow the fine granular identification and
analysis of critical components, what is a prerequisite for
the development of sensible countermeasures. Furthermore, PN enable the formal modeling of networks
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considering dynamic and stochastic aspects (Arns et al.
2002). Wu et al. (2007) introduce the disruption analysis
network (DA_NET) approach based on PN to model and
quantify the propagation of disruptions in supply chains.
Extending the DA_NET approach, Fridgen et al. (2014)
provide a modular modeling approach that enables the
simulation and quantification of exogenous shocks in
supply networks considering dynamic and stochastic
aspects. Although these approaches provide a solid foundation in modeling, they do not consider the peculiarities of
information networks in smart factories (e.g., operational
states, timing failures). However, there is also a growing
number of scientific literature that deals with the description and quantification of security risks in smart factories
(Amin et al. 2013; Broy et al. 2012; Cardenas et al. 2009;
Sadeghi et al. (nd); Sathanur and Haglin 2016). For
instance, based on a game-theoretic approach, Amin et al.
(2013) provide a framework for assessing security risks to
CPS that can be caused by security attacks or random
errors. Sathanur and Haglin (2016) introduce a centrality
measure for the assessment of vulnerability in CPS by
considering direct compromise and indirect compromise
through attack spread. However, these approaches neglect
different operational states and important aspects such as
dynamic behavior of propagation effects. Nevertheless, to
enable the assessment of IT availability risks in a sensible
manner, informational dependencies within information
networks must be considered. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no formal modeling approach for the
depiction of information networks in smart factories.
Therefore, in this paper we focus on the modeling of
information networks considering IT availability risks. Our
approach enables the simulation of different information
network settings and different threats in an integrated
manner.

3 Modeling Approach Based on Petri Nets
To address the raised research question, we follow the
guidelines for DSR from Hevner et al. (2004) and apply the
DSR methodology from Peffers et al. (2007) to develop a
modeling approach as design artifact (Offermann et al.
2010). Therefore, the DSR methodology (Peffers et al.
2007) suggests the following six activities for the development of artifacts: (1) identify problem; (2) define design
objectives for solution; (3) design and develop; (4)
demonstrate; (5) evaluate; and (6) communicate. Step 1
was already addressed in Sect. 1 by highlighting the relevance of formalized modeling approaches for the depiction
and simulation of information networks in smart factories.
In Sect. 2, we deduced design objectives for our artifact as
well as requirements for the modeling approach (step 2) to
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ensure that our artifact helps to solve the research question.
In this section, we start with the design and development of
our artifact (step 3).
We base our modeling approach on PN that were
developed by Carl Adam Petri (1962) as PN fulfill the
postulated requirements (cf. sect. 2). PN provide an intuitive graphical notation as well as a formal notation
enabling the mathematical analysis of information networks (van der Aalst 1998), fulfilling requirements R.1 and
R.2. As existing PN approaches do not consider specific
characteristics of smart factory information networks, we
build on different PN approaches as a basis for the development of our modeling approach under consideration of
the possessed requirements. First, to handle the complexity
of large information networks and to enhance practicability, we adapt the concept of modularization developed for
supply chains (Fridgen et al. 2014) fulfilling requirement
R.3. Further, as PN consist of passive places and active
transitions that symbolize states and actions (i.e., state
changes), respectively, they fulfill requirement R.4. To
cover dynamic behavior, firing delays are associated to
transitions, specifying the duration of activities (Murata
1989). Several concepts regarding firing delays can be
distinguished. For instance, Ramchandani (1974) developed timed Petri nets that associate a deterministic firing
delay to each transition. Merlin (1974) introduced time
Petri nets (TPN) that use time intervals to describe lower
and upper bounds for the duration of activities. In
stochastic Petri nets (SPN), an exponentially distributed
firing delay is assigned to transitions (Molloy 1981). Further, Marsan et al. (1984) introduced generalized stochastic
Petri nets (GSPN) that consider immediate transitions (zero
firing delay) as well as timed transitions (exponentially
distributed firing delay) extending SPN. Regarding
requirement R.5, we adapt the GSPN approach by Marsan
et al. (1984) using immediate and timed transitions to
capture the dynamic behavior (e.g., propagation of attacks
and timing failures) of information networks. Thereby, the
timing requires preselection rules for transitions that come
into conflict when multiple transitions share input places
and can fire at the same point in time competing for the
same token. The preselection of transitions can be performed, beside others, deterministically with priorities or
randomly with probabilities (Balbo and Silva 1998). Necessary information for the parametrization of priority values could be gathered from technical data sheets of IT
components and system specifications. To depict stochastic
events (e.g., attacks on specific components), probabilities
can be assigned to transitions fulfilling requirement R.6.
Thereby, probability values for attacks can be derived from
official statistics (e.g., from the European Union Agency
for Network and Information Security – ENISA Threat
Landscape Report). The obtained values could be adjusted
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based on expert’s expectations (e.g., regarding the development of the number of attacks) or individual internal
measurements (e.g., the installation of a new cyber security
system). Regarding internal errors, internal incident reports
can be the basis for the estimation of appropriate probability values. Moreover, to depict timing failures between
dependent components, we adapt the idea of guard functions from colored Petri nets (CPN) (Jensen 1991).
Accordingly, considering the aforementioned requirements
R.1 to R.6, we use GSPN with immediate and exponentially distributed firing times and enhance the GSPN with
deterministic and stochastic preselection of transitions as
well as guard functions to fulfill the derived requirements.
This enables the consideration of specific characteristics of
smart factory information networks such as the dynamic
behavior, i.e., propagation effects and timing failures
within the information network.
3.1 Mathematical Specification
In this subsection, we briefly describe the basic functioning
of PN and specify the mathematical definition of our
modeling approach. PN are defined as bipartite graphs
consisting of places, transitions, and arcs. If places additionally carry tokens, PN are called ‘‘marked PN’’. The
current state of a PN is specified by its marking, i.e., the
number of tokens on each place. The PN changes its state
by the enabling of transitions which remove tokens from
input places and create tokens on output places. A detailed
explanation and functional description of PN can be found
by Murata (1989).
To describe the information network by means of our
modeling approach in a formalized way, there is a finite set
S
1
of places P ¼ m
1 ; . . .; pm g. Further, there is a
i¼1 fpi g ¼ fpS
n  
finite set of transitions T ¼ j¼1 tj ¼ ft1 ; . . .; tn g, consisting of immediate and timed transitions. These include
timed transitions with different timing requirements like
the special case of real-time constraints or other timing
requirements (for instance, for repair times), as well as
transitions without timing specifications defining pure
YES/NO decisions (for instance, transitions that determine
whether a component is affected by an attack or not). Arcs
are divided into two finite sets of directed arcs: the input
matrix I  ðP  TÞ defines arcs from places to transitions,
whereas the output matrix O  ðT  PÞ defines arcs from
transitions to places. The binary variables Ii;j and Oi;j equal
1 if there exists a directed arc from place pi to transition tj
or from transition tj to place pi , respectively. Otherwise, Ii;j
and Oi;j equal 0. The entries of the input and output
1

Table A.1 in the online appendix provides an overview of the
nomenclature of our PN specification (available online via http://
springerlink.com).
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matrices are determined by the structure of the information
network. The resulting incidence matrix A is calculated by
equation (Eq.) 1:
A¼OI

ð1Þ


The marking vector M h ¼ M h ðp1 Þ; . . .; M h ðpm Þ , contains for each point in time h with h 2 f0; . . .; Hg the
number of tokens on each place pi , where M 0 indicates the
initial marking vector. If there is more than one transition
requiring the same input token from a common input place
at h, there is a conflict. The conflict resolution type vector
CR ¼ ½cr1 ; . . .; crm  assigns each place pi its type of conflict
resolution determining whether a conflict is resolved by
priority ðcri ¼ 0Þ or probability ðcri ¼ 1Þ.. According to
the conflict resolution type, the conflict parameter vector
CP ¼ ½cp1 ; . . .; cpn  assigns each transition tj a specific
priority or probability, respectively. Further, the guard


function vector Gh ¼ gh ðt1 Þ; . . .; gh ðtn Þ with gh ðtj Þ 2
ftrue; falseg assigns each transition tj additional enabling
conditions. Therefore, a transition tj is enabled if (1) each
input place contains enough tokens and (2) the enabling
conditions of the assigned guard function Gh ðtj Þ are fulfilled, i.e. gh ðtj Þ ¼ true. Hence, the enabling vector Eh ¼
 h

e ðt1 Þ; . . .; eh ðtn Þ with eh ðtj Þ 2 f0; 1g determines whether
a transition tj is enabled at point in time h. The transition
type vector TT ¼ ½tt1 ; . . .; ttn  determines whether a transition is an immediate ðttj ¼ 0Þ or timed ðttj ¼ 1Þ transtion.
Further, the fire rate vector FR ¼ ½fr1 ; . . .; frn  specifies the
firing rate determining the firing delay of timed transitions.
Whenever a timed transition is enabled, a random firing
delay is assigned to it. With every time step, the firing
delay decreases. Once the firing delay equals zero the
transition fires. Therefore, the firing vector F h ¼
 h

f ðt1 Þ; . . .; f h ðtn Þ with f h ðtj Þ 2 f0; 1g determines whether
a transition tj fires at h. Thereby, the marking of the next
point in time h þ 1 is calculated by Eq. 2:
M hþ1 ¼ M h þ A  Fh

ð2Þ

As the information network is composed of several
components, we define a set of components
S
C ¼ ok¼1 fck g ¼ fc1 ; . . .; co g. For example, and in reference to Fig. 2, a set of components can include, but is not
limited to, servers, cloud-based or on-premise hosted IT
services, data storage, external interfaces, and sensors,
actuators, and embedded systems of smart production
machines. Each component ck is described by a subset of
places Pc  P and a subset of transitions Tc  T (Vladimir
2011). To depict timing failures and, hence, informational
dependencies between components, the unavailability of a
component ck at a certain point in time h and the maximum
acceptable interruption time between two components ck
and ck^ are required. For this, the unavailability of a
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component, that represents the duration of a component’s
unavailability, is depicted by matrix U h ¼
 h

u ðc1 Þ; . . .; uh ðco Þ with uh ðc1 Þ 2 N0 and the maximum
acceptable interruption time is depicted by matrix L with
Lk;k^ 2 N.

4 Modeling Procedure
In this section, we illustrate our modeling procedure for
answering our research question. Following Simon (1996),
we conducted several generate-and-test cycles during the
design process to derive an appropriate approach fulfilling
the derived design objectives and requirements. To depict
components and their interdependencies, we develop a
modeling module representing one essential artifact of our
research. Thereby, each component ck is illustrated by a
modeling module, framed by a rounded rectangle as shown
in Fig. 5.
A modeling module consists of six places (p1 to p6 ) and
seven transitions (t1 to t7 ). The state places p1 to p4 (white
circles) represent the current state s 2 fOP; OH; FA; FEg
of a component. The operational state, for instance, is
represented by one token on place p1 , summarized by the
marking vector of the state places M h ¼ ½1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0.
Figure 6 shows all states a component can exhibit and their
depiction by our modeling module. The on hold state is
defined by a token on the places p1 and p2 . Further, the
failed after error and the failed after attack states are
depicted by a token on place p3 or place p4 , respectively.
The structure of complex information networks can be
built up by means of the modeling modules. Therefore, the
modeling modules can interact with each other via interface places (striped circles) that are positioned on the
borderlines of the module, as well as via guard functions
that are assigned to transitions. The input interface place
(IIP) p5 and the output interface place (OIP) p6 facilitate
the depiction of attacks and attack propagation within the
information network by connecting components according
to information flows between them. The guard functions
depict if required information is available within a given

State Place
Interface Place
Immediate Transition
1

Timed Transition
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time. As seen in Fig. 5, four immediate transitions (black
rectangles) depict whether there is a timing failure or not
(t1 and t2 ), or whether an attack harms a component or not
(t5 and t6 ). Moreover, three timed transitions (white rectangles) depict the time to error (t3 ) as well as the time to
recover after an error or attack (t4 and t7 ). Thereby, the
time to error represents the assumed time span between
errors, i.e., the time between the occurrences of two errors.
The time to error can be assessed based on historical data
regarding the number of errors in a certain interval. The
time to recovery includes both the predicted times for
detection and repair of a failure after an error or attack.
Taking the operational state as a starting point, we describe
in the following how (1) timing failures, (2) errors, and (3)
attacks as well as their propagation within the information
network are depicted in our modeling approach.
The timing failure model is depicted by means of the
state places p1 (for status OP) and p2 (for status OH), the
transitions t1 and t2 , and the assigned guard functions
Gh ðt1 Þ and Gh ðt2 Þ. Thereby, the guard functions monitor
whether the unavailability U h ðck Þ of other components
exceeds the maximum acceptable interruption time Lk;k^ (cf.
Fig. 7).
To demonstrate the timing failure mechanism, we consider an example consisting of two components c1 and c2 .
Component c2 (e.g., a sensor) supports component c1 (e.g.,
an embedded system) with necessary information. Hence,
the operational capability of component c1 depends on the
information transmitted by component c2 in real-time.
Figure 6 shows the subsequent states of component c1 . The
guard function Gh ðt1 Þ is true if the unavailability of component c2 exceeds the maximum acceptable interruption
time (e.g., due to a technical defect) enabling transition t1
of component c1 (step 1/ h = 1). Subsequently, transition t1
fires and an additional token is created on place p2
changing the state of component c1 from operational to on
hold (step 2/ h = 27). As there is both an arc from p1 to t1
and from t1 to p1 , the marking of place p1 after firing is the
same. Once component c2 is recovered and its unavailability is less than the maximum acceptable interruption
time, guard function Gh ðt2 Þ of component c1 is true,
enabling transition t2 . The firing of transition t2 only consumes the token on place p2 as transition t2 is a sink
transition without outgoing arcs (step 3/ h = 43). Therefore, the state of component c1 changes from on hold back
to operational.
Moreover, the error model enables the consideration of
randomly occurring errors such as technical defects or
erroneous entry of data by operators and their effects on the
operational capability of the smart factory. For this, the
error model comprises a sequence of the three states

Fig. 5 Modeling of an information network component
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Operational (OP)

On Hold (OH)

Failed after Error (FE)

Failed after Attack (FA)

Fig. 6 Component states depicted in the model

operational, failed after error, and on hold as shown in
Fig. 8.
The exponentially distributed firing delays of the error
sequence are described by the error rate kE and the error
recovery rate kER . These fire rates define the stochastic time
to error (e.g., TTE = 25) and time to recovery (e.g.,
TTR = 10) that are associated to the timed transitions t3
and t4 . The information about their parametrization is
available through sources such as maintenance information
of manufacturers, and hence, can be assessed and applied
as exogenous input parameters to our model. After the
assigned time to error elapsed, transition t3 fires, representing the occurrence of an error of the component (step 1/
h = 1). Therefore, transition t3 consumes the token on
place p1 and creates a token on place p3 changing the state
of the component from operational to failed after error
(step 2/ h = 26). Subsequently, transition t4 is enabled and
the random firing delay time to recovery is assigned to it.
Once the time to recovery is elapsed and the component is
recovered, transition 4 fires and the component exhibits the
on hold state (step 3/ h = 36). In this state, the component
monitors whether all necessary information from supporting components is accessible. Once all necessary information is accessible, the component’s state switches back
to operational (step 4/ h = 37), otherwise the component
stays on hold (see timing failure model described above).
Finally, the attack model includes the three states operational, failed after attack, and on hold as well as the IIP
p5 and OIP p6 as shown in Fig. 9.
The occurrence of an attack is represented by the presence of a token on the IIP p5 enabling both transitions t5
and t6 (step 1=h = 1). Whether an attack is successful (t5
fires) or not successful (t6 fires) is determined randomly
according to the assigned probabilities 1  a and a,
respectively. Hence, the parameter a can be interpreted as a
measure for the security level of components. If an attack is
not successful, transition t6 consumes the token on IIP p5
and the component remains in the operational state (step
2a/ h = 2). In contrast, if the attack is successful, transition
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t5 consumes the tokens on the state places p1 and IIP p5 and
creates a token on the state place p4 and OIP p6 (step 2b/
h = 2). The token on the state place p4 initiates the
recovery of the component and the token on OIP p6 depicts
the attack propagation to other, connected components.
Subsequently, transition t7 is enabled and the attack
recovery rate kAR defines the stochastic time to recovery
(e.g., TTR = 10) assigned to transition t7 . Once the time to
recovery is elapsed and the component is recovered, the
component switches to the on hold state (step 3/ h = 12)
and monitors whether all necessary information from
supporting components are accessible (see the timing failure model described above). Finally, the component is in
the operational state again/step 4/ h = 13).
As shown in Fig. 10, the attack propagation is depicted
by the OIP and IIP on the borderlines of the modeling
modules. We apply the idea of fusion of places as described by Murata (1989), where the OIP of component c1 and
the corresponding IIP oFf component c2 are represented by
the same place pi . Hence, if an attack is successful and a
token is created on the OIP of component c1 there is also a
token on the corresponding IIP of component c2 enabling
the above-described attack model. Moreover, if a component is connected to more than one other component, the
number of OIPs within a modeling module can be expanded to an arbitrary number as indicated in component c2
(cf. Fig. 10).
Further, to represent the stochastic occurrence of attacks
and to simulate the expected number of attacks in a certain
time interval, we adopt a shock module as introduced by
Fridgen et al. (2014). The shock module shown in Fig. 11
comprises one transition t1 and one or multiple OIPs.
Transition t1 is a source transition (i.e., without input places) and, thus, is always enabled. The attack rate kA defines
the random firing delay time to attack that is associated
with transition t1 . After the firing delay elapsed, transition
t1 fires and creates a token on the OIP representing the
occurrence of an attack. Thereby, one OIP of the shock
module is connected to one IIP of a modeling module. To
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Step 3
: Operational
Exemplary Guard Functions:

: Failed After Error

: On Hold

Guard Function

of Component

If

then

Guard Function

of Component

If

then

:

:

: Operational (OP)

TTR=40

TTR: time to recovery

Fig. 7 Timing failure sequence

Step 1: Operational

Step 2: Failed after Error

TTE = 25

TTR = 10

Step 3: On Hold

Step 4: Operational

TTR: time to recovery
TTE: time to error

Fig. 8 Error sequence

depict simultaneous attacks (Amin et al. 2013) the number
of OIPs within the shock module can be expanded analogously to the modeling module (cf. Fig. 11).

5 Evaluation
Following Sonnenberg and vom Brocke (2012), within this
section, we demonstrate and evaluate the feasibility and
applicability of our modeling approach. For this purpose,
they propose a combination of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation activities (Eval1 to Eval4) in artificial and naturalistic
environments. Thereby, Eval1 requires the presentation of
the research topic as a meaningful DSR problem and the

formulation of design objectives. Eval2 validates the
design specification against the postulated design objectives. Eval3 aims to validate the feasibility of a prototype in
an artificial setting. Finally, Eval4 serves the purpose of
validating the applicability of the developed artifact from a
naturalistic perspective.
We already conducted Eval1 activity in Sects. 1 and 2
by identifying the need for a formalized approach for the
modeling of information networks in smart factories.
Sections 3 and 4 described the logical reasoning of our
artifact, the modeling approach.
In Sect. 5.1, we validate the design specification against
the possessed design objectives and requirements from the
literature by means of a feature comparison. Further, in
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Step 2a: Operational
attack not
successful
( fires)

Step 1: Operational

Step 2b: Failed after Attack

Step 3: On Hold

Step 4: Operational

attack
successful
( fires)

TTR: time to recovery

TTR=10

Fig. 9 Attack sequence

Sect. 5.2, we simulate an exemplary information network
based on a real-world setting in an artificial setting (Eval3)
to demonstrate the feasibility of our modeling approach
and to show that our artifact behaves as intended for single
test cases (Sonnenberg and Vom Brocke 2012). In
Sect. 5.3, we apply key figures that are based on the data
generated by our modeling approach to demonstrate its
usefulness for the analysis of an information network, its
interdependencies, and the propagation behavior of failures
over time. Finally, to validate the modeling approach from
a naturalistic perspective (Eval4), we interview experts
from two leading global companies in the automation and

flexible packaging sector and an academic PN expert (cf.
Sect. 5.4).
5.1 Feature Comparison
In Sect. 2, we derived design objectives for the development of our modeling approach. We compare these design
objectives with the design specifications of our developed
modeling approach to validate whether our developed
artifact fulfills these design objectives (Venable et al.
2012).

Step 1
: Operational

Step 2
: Operational

: Failed after Attack

: Operational

OIP 1
OIP 2
Output Interface
Place of ( )

=

Input Interface
Place of ( )

Place
Marking
Component

Fig. 10 Attack propagation sequence
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Fig. 11 Structure of a shock
module
OIP 1
OIP 2

DO:1

DO:2

DO:3

Graphical and formal representation: Our modeling approach is based on PN providing both a
graphical representation of modeling modules and
a formal representation of information networks.
Owing to the exact mathematical definition of PN,
it is possible to convert information networks into
mathematical equations enabling computer-based
simulations of complex real-world settings.
Scalability: Our modeling approach depicts the
information network as a multitude of single
modeling modules and dependencies between
them. This modularization enables the modeling
of information networks of different sizes and
compositions.
Threats: Our modeling approach provides the
possibility to model and simulate different threats
(intentional attacks via virus attacks and technical
errors) as well as associated propagation effects
(attack and timing failure propagation) (cf.
sect. 4).

Based on this design objective comparison, we can state
that our developed modeling approach fulfills all design
objectives derived in Sect. 2.
5.2 Simulation Based Analysis of an Exemplary
Information Network
To demonstrate the feasibility of our modeling approach,
we simulate an exemplary information network that is

Server 1 (On-Premise)
MES
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based on a real-world setting oriented on a matrix production principle of a leading robotics manufacturer (cf.
Fig. 12) and that is affected by different threats. For this,
we model the information network of a production environment consisting of five robotic cells that are a section of
a larger smart factory.
The information network consists of 211 components
(modeling modules) containing servers, IT services, data
storage, external interfaces, embedded systems, sensors,
and actuators. The exemplary setting is based on a realworld setting of one of the leading robotic manufacturers
with its matrix organized production concept for customers
for the production of industrial goods and, thus, is geared
toward a close-to-reality production infrastructure. There
are five robotic cells equipped with four industrial robots
on the shop floor of the smart factory. Each industrial robot
embraces one embedded system, three sensors (e.g., temperature or ultrasonic sensor), and six actuators (six axis
robots) to flexibly perform production tasks. The embedded
systems, sensors, and actuators are modeled as components
of the information network. Embedded systems control
sensors and actuators as well as exchange production and
machine data between industrial robots, IT services, and
data storage. According to real-time requirements and data
volumes, IT services and data storage can be hosted either
on on-premise servers (e.g., MES, ERP) or via external
interfaces in the cloud (e.g., big data analytics). Thereby,
the MES and ERP applications perform traditional production tasks (e.g., production planning and control),
whereas big data applications analyze production and
machine data to predict, for instance, productivity, quality,
and maintenance jobs. Based on these analyses, big data
applications give MES and ERP applications feedback to
optimize production processes. Further, we assume that a
failure of the on-premise server (hosting MES and ERP
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Fig. 12 Exemplary smart factory information network
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Table 2 Scenario
specifications

Scenario 1 – attack
Case 1A
Number of simulation runs

Case 1B

Case 2A

Case 2B

1000

Number of points in time

100

Number of components

211

Error rate (kE )

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

Error recovery rate (kER )

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.1

Security level a

0.90

0.99

0.90

0.90

applications) can lead to a standstill of the entire smart
factory due to missing necessary information of the MES
and ERP. In contrast, a failure of the cloud server (hosting
big data applications) affects only the ability of the smart
factory to optimize production flows, but the operational
capability of production remains unaffected.
Taken this initial setting, we consider two scenarios (i.e.,
Scenario 1 – Attack and Scenario 2 – Error) to demonstrate
and analyze the impact of different threats on the operational capability of the information network by using the
unavailability rate as a measure for the impact of failures.
The simulations are based on the following specifications
(see Table 2).
We developed an application using MATLAB, which
allows us to design, simulate, and analyze generalized
stochastic nets. Our application considers immediate and
timed transitions. Timed transitions can be deterministic or
stochastic. Furthermore, priorities or probabilities can be
assigned to conflicting transitions. We use this application
to simulate and analyze the information network modeled
by means of our PN approach.
We conduct 1000 simulation runs for each scenario. In
each simulation run, we observe a time frame of 100 points
in time and the states of 211 components of the smart
factory information network (see Fig. 12) resulting in
21,100 states. For all simulation runs we define that the
start marking was the same (i.e., all of the 211 components
are in the state ‘‘operational’’). However, the stochastic
effects of the threat events (e.g., probability of a successful
attack or the exponentially distributed time to error) lead to
different results in each simulation run. Thereby, the error
failure rate as well as the error and attack recovery rates of
Fig. 13 Simulation results:
Unavailability rates for scenario
1 – attack and scenario 2 – error

Scenario 2 – error

all components are set to kE ¼ 0:0001 and
kER ¼ kAR ¼ 0:01, meaning that errors occur in one out of
10,000 points in time and that recovery after errors and
attacks takes about 100 points in time. Both information
are based on technical specifications of IT components and
can be gathered from technical data sheets. The maximum
acceptable interruption time Lk;k^ between components
within a robotic cl is set to one (real-time requirement),
between robotic cells to 20 points in time, and between IT
services and embedded systems to 60 points in time. Further, the Lk;k^. between servers and IT services is also set to
one depicting functional dependencies.
In Scenario 1 – Attack, we assume an adversary that
performs a coordinated cyber-attack on all embedded systems of robotic cell 1 via the internet (e.g., via a remote
maintenance channel). Thereby, a successful attack can
compromise other, directly connected components (e.g.,
sensors, IT services) according to their security level. First,
we assume that the embedded systems run an out-of-date
firmware and hence, offer a security level of only 90%.
After installing a security update, the security level
increases to 99%. Comparing the two security levels, the
unavailability rate decreases from 30 to 1% (see Fig. 13).
The results indicate that an increased security level dramatically reduces the unavailability rate and, therefore, the
impact of an adversary on the operational capability of the
information network.
In Scenario 2 – Error, we consider a technical defect of
the on-premise server leading to failures of the MES and
ERP applications. To demonstrate how timing failures
affect the operational capability of the smart factory, we
analyze different recovery rates of the on-premise server.
Unavailability Rate

40%
30%

27%

30%
20%

13%

10%
1%
0%
Case 1A
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Case 1B

Case 2A

Case 2B

D. Miehle et al.: Modeling IT Availability Risks in Smart Factories, Bus Inf Syst Eng 62(4):323–345 (2020)

339

Table 3 Component states and corresponding state vectors
States

Operational (OP)

On hold (OH)

Failed after attack (FA)

Function executable

Yes

Yes

No

No

Information accessible

Yes

No

Yes or no

Yes or no

State vector vbck ;h

vbck ;h ¼ ½1; 0; 0; 0

vbck ;h ¼ ½0; 1; 0; 0

vbck ;h ¼ ½0; 0; 1; 0

vbck ;h ¼ ½0; 0; 0; 1

First, we assume a recovery time defined by the recovery
rate kER ¼ 0:01. After improving the recovery process and
fault diagnosis (e.g., by the use of augmented reality) the
recovery time decreases (kER ¼ 0:1). Thereby, the
unavailability rate decreases from 27 to 13% (see Fig. 13).
The results indicate that an improved recovery rate reduces
the unavailability rate and, hence, the impact of an error of
the on-premise server on the information network.
In summary, the results of the scenario simulation
indicate the applicability of the modeling approach to a
production environment that is close to real world. In
addition, the simulation results demonstrate the application
possibilities of our approach for deriving suitable security
and prevention measures. Of course, the size of the modeled information network is limited and information networks of smart factories in practice are far more complex
because they consist of considerably more components.
Nevertheless, the application of our modeling approach to a
close-to-real-world scenario within the simulation and its
results demonstrate that our approach is principally suitable for more complex scenarios due to the modular
structure of our modeling approach. Further, the application demonstrates that there is a need for an adequate
modeling approach that enables detailed analysis of IT
availability risks (cf. sect. 5.3).
5.3 Application of Key Figures
Besides the simulation results described in Sect. 5.2, the
data regarding the components’ states and their operational
capability (ref. Table 1) generated by the simulation can be
used to analyze the information network, its interdependencies, and the propagation behavior of failures over time
in more detail. The development of corresponding key
figures that are calculated on the basis of the generated data
seems promising to support the identification of critical
components. Although the elaborated development of such
key figures is subject to further research (source left blind
due to double-blind review), we briefly describe two
potential key figures that can be derived from our
approach.
For this, the current state s 2 fOP; OH; FA; FEg of each
component at h is depicted by the state vector
OH
FA
FE
s
vbck ;h ¼ ½bOP
ck ;h ; bck ;h ; bck ;h ; bck ;h ], where bck ;h represents a binary variable that takes the value 1 if component ck is in

Failed after error (FE)

state s at h, else 0. By means of the state vector vbck ;h , the
state of each component is defined clearly for each point in
time h. Table 3 provides an overview over the states, their
attributes, and the associated state vector.
Based on the state vector, we develop the key figures availability and operational availability to analyze the
smart factory’s information network regarding its operational capability after an attack or error:
Dynamic key figure ‘‘Availability’’: The availability of
b b
the information network AVh ð M;
hÞ measures the share of
components that are able to provide their function ( s 2
b of the comfOP; OH gÞ at h considering that a subset M
ponents initially fails2 at b
h due to an attack or error (see
Eq. 3).
Dynamic key figure ‘‘Operational availability’’: The
operational availability of the information network
b b
opAVh ð M;
hÞ measures the share of components that are
able to provide their function and access necessary inforb of the
mation ( s 2 fOPgÞ at h considering that a subset M
b
components initially fails at h due to an attack or error
(see Eq. 4).
PC OP PC OH
c¼1 bck ;h þ
c¼1 bck ;h
b
b
AVh ðð M; hÞ ¼
ð3Þ
C
PC OP
c¼1 bck ;h
b
b
ð4Þ
opAVh ðð M; hÞÞ ¼
C
To calculate the two key figures, the values of the state
vectors obtained from the marking vector resulting from
the simulation and fulfilling the respective criteria (for
Eq. 3 s 2 fOP; OH g, for Eq. 4 s 2 fOPg) are summed up.
By means of the distinction between availability and operational availability, the information network and its
components can be analysed regarding their operational
capabilities as well as their informational dependencies to
identify critical components. Whereas traditional availability key figures often only cover whether a system is in a
functioning condition or not, our approach enables a
detailed depiction of four different relevant states. This
enables the determination of the extent of non-availability
of components that results solely from informational
2 b
b  NÞ consisting of one or multiple
M is a subset of N ð M
components (e.g., in case of common cause failures or synchronized
attacks) and representing the initial trigger of failures.
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Fig. 14 Illustration of AV and opAV after failure (a) and attack (b) for an exemplary simulation run

dependencies. They can be applied to analyze an entire
information network, a subnetwork, or selected components. Thus, the key figures support the improvement of
already existing information networks through targeted
security measures as well as the development of a sensible
design and configuration of new information networks.
To demonstrate the application of the key figures, Fig. 14
contains the exemplary course of a worst-case simulation run
of two different scenarios that resulted both in a significant
non-availability of IT components and, thus, a restriction of
the production system. For this analysis, we selected two
worst-case courses among the generated simulation runs.
The worst-case courses show different effects on the information network: (a) a failure of the server (e.g., caused by an
incorrect software update) and (b) an attack on one embedded system that can compromise other directly connected
components with a given probability.
As shown in Fig. 14a, the availability in scenario (a)
drops to 98% and remains constantly at this level after the
failure of the server at h ¼ 1. However, the operational
availability considerably decreases stepwise, as IT services
depend functionally on the server. Consequently, controllers (drop 2 in Fig. 14a), embedded systems, and all
dependent sensors and actuators (drop 3 and 4 in Fig. 14a)
exhibit the OH state due to missing information, resulting
in a standstill of the entire smart factory. After the server is
repaired, all components restore their operational capability and change their state from OH to OP as necessary
information is accessible, again. Finally, the entire smart
factory is restored and fully functional. This worst-case
scenario illustrates that a failure of central components, i.e.,
the server, leads to an inoperability of the entire smart
factory and, thus, a significant economic damage.
As shown in Fig. 14b, the attack on the embedded
system causes a rapid drop of the components’ availability
to 41%. The rapid drop can be explained by the spread to
directly connected components leading to a functional
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incapacity of these components, too. Thereby, the operational availability decreases to 30% as missing information
causes further components to interrupt their function
(s 2 fOH g). As soon as components begin to restore their
operational capability, there is a gradually increase of
availability and a stepwise increase of operational availability. This stepwise increase can be explained by the fact
that all components of a production cell have to be restored
until the production cell is completely functional, again.
These exemplary worst-case courses of failure propagations within the information network illustrate that our
modeling approach can be used as the basis for detailed
analyses of information networks and their components
and, thus, provides value for practitioners. The analysis of
single worst-case courses is especially important as the
potentially worst-case courses of propagation effects can
cause significant damage to companies and, thus, represent
extreme risk potentials for companies like complete production downtimes or a loss of operations that result in
significant economic damage. These worst-case courses
would not be observable if the data of simulation runs is
accumulated, for instance, to average values. Thus, our
modeling approach and the application of key figures such
as the described ones enable the profound analysis of different structural designs of information networks and the
targeted derivation of IT security measures to avoid or
soften worst-case courses. Accordingly, the identification
of beneficial design features such as precise and highly
effective air gaps between components of the information
network or the implementation of redundant IT components is facilitated.
5.4 Expert Interviews
To complement the evaluation from a naturalistic perspective, we interviewed experts from two companies to
cover different views and an academic PN expert. Thereby,
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we discussed our modeling approach with the experts indepth and based on the exemplary application in the closeto-reality structure from Sect. 5.2 and the application of
key figures in Sect. 5.3. The interviews with the experts
from practice, who deal with our research context on a
daily basis in detail, focused on the first two phases of the
DSR methodology (problem identification and design
objectives) and helped to validate the usability and realworld fidelity of our modeling approach.
First, we interviewed the chief information officer of
PACKAGING, one of the world’s leading manufacturers of
flexible packaging with 10,000 employees in 23 countries
and sales of €1.9 billion in 2015. PACKAGING extensively applies automation technologies in their production
facilities and, thus, provides great experience with comprehensive information networks and digital technologies
within production facilities. The expert confirmed the need
for a modeling approach that depicts information networks
in smart factories to analyze both attacks and errors in a
separated and integrated manner as, till date, corresponding
approaches are missing. Further, he considered our
abstraction of a smart factory network, the categorization
of threats, and the proposed design objectives and
requirements of our research as useful and sensible. For
further research, he remarked that employees might not be
familiar with the graphical representation of a modeled
information network component due to the specific notation of PN. Further, the graphical representability of the
entire modeled information network might suffer in large
information networks and become rather complex and
confusing. Both limitations could be addressed by an userfriendly graphical user interface in combination with drill
down functions and a defined hierarchical structure that is
able to condense large information networks on customizable granularity levels. For instance, these hierarchy
levels could be defined on a component level, production
cell level, or production area level.
The second organization ROBOTIC is a manufacturer of
industrial robots and intelligent automation solutions.
ROBOTIC has about 12,300 employees and sales of €3
billion. We interviewed the vice president of digital strategy of ROBOTIC, who holds a doctorate in business &
information systems engineering and has several years of
experience in the field of automation and robotics. This
expert also confirmed the need for modeling and analyzing
IT availability risks in smart factory information networks
and the lack of corresponding approaches, till date. He
highlighted that the modularization of our PN approach is
helpful in managing the increasing size and complexity of
information networks. Further, he remarked that the
development of key performance indices is necessary to
enable employees of the IT department to analyze and
improve the security of smart factory information
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networks. This important remark was integrated in our
research and led to the development of the key figures presented in Sect. 5.3. Moreover, he pointed out
that the consideration of a dynamic failure rate would be
beneficial, as failure rates of technical applications generally change during service life (cf. Weibull distribution).
Since the application of our modeling approach in the
paper at hand is steered towards an already installed smart
factory network that is in an established, running operational mode, the consideration of life cycle effects such as
set-up difficulties or wear-out of components is not necessary. However, this would be possible through an
appropriate parametrization and the use of suitable distributions. Further remarks from these experts were used as
orientation for the parametrization of the exemplary simulation in Sect. 5.2 (for instance, regarding the security
level of components or the error recovery rate).
Lastly, we interviewed a professor for electrical engineering with a background in mechatronic and control
engineering as an expert for PN to evaluate our modeling
approach from a methodological perspective. The interviewed expert focuses in his research on flexible automation and cooperative robotics in the field of Industry 4.0
and, thus, besides the methodological knowledge about PN
he possess relevant practical knowledge about smart factories and their information networks. This expert confirmed that our developed modeling approach addresses a
highly relevant research topic as the analysis of IT availability risks in complex smart factory information networks
requires the development of appropriate approaches. In the
opinion of the expert, our approach can serve as a basis for
the analysis of different interconnection patterns of information networks and for failure analysis, for instance, of
common-cause failures. Further, he confirmed that our
design objectives and requirements derived from literature
are decisive and plausible. He highlighted, that our
approach by means of stochastic PN approach is highly
valuable for the structured modeling of complex information networks and that our modeling approach is plausible
and comprehensible. Further, he emphasized that the data
necessary for the parametrization of our modeling
approach in real-world application scenarios can be gathered through different sources relating to functional safety
such as technical data sheets of component manufacturers.
The expert also suggested that the consideration of functional safety and its impairment by IT availability risks
would have been another interesting element. Since we
focused our research on IT availability risks and their direct
effects in the information network, this represents an
interesting opportunity for further research.
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6 Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Work
The digitalization and interconnection of production
infrastructures lead to new challenges for companies
(Amin et al. 2013). In particular, the flawless functioning
of information networks and the exchange of information
in real-time are prerequisites for the operational capability
of smart factories. Therefore, in this paper we have presented a stochastic PN approach to model and simulate
information networks of smart factories considering different threats. The key benefits of our modeling approach
are:
•

•

•

Increased transparency and controllability of complexity as the modularization of the modeling approach
enables the depiction and simulation of increasingly
complex and dynamic information network settings;
Analysis of different threat scenarios and derivation of
valuable recommendations towards sensible design
patterns for smart factory information networks and
degree of interconnectivity;
Identification of weak spots in the information network
and basis for the derivation of appropriate countermeasures against IT availability risks that is subject to
further research.

To validate the developed modeling approach, we have
simulated different threats compromising an artificial
information network setting and interviewed experts from
two global leading companies and an academic PN expert.
The results indicate that the developed approach is appropriate for the modeling of information networks in smart
factories and the analysis of associated IT availability risks.
Considering the examples of Stuxnet, locky, WannaCry, or
the steel mill provided in the introduction, our modeling
approach can support companies in their preventive risk
management by modeling, simulating, and analyzing the
information network and by identifying weak spots and
critical dependencies through the qualitative comparison of
different threat scenarios. For this, our modeling approach
provides the starting points for a profound comparison of
different threat scenarios by creating transparency and
providing a structured modeling approach. In addition to
quantitative key figures, a more qualitative analysis, e.g.,
on the basis of expert assessments and expert discussions
(see also our expert interviews in Sect. 5.4), should also be
conducted in any case, since pure key figure-based comparisons are not sufficient, e.g., due to uncertainties in
parameterization. However, these discussions are made
possible or are really effective only through the transparency created by structured approaches such as our
modeling approach. Accordingly, the insights gained by
our approach can be used as a starting point to investigate
targeted IT-security measures to reduce risks associated
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with IT availability. Accordingly, the insights imply that
our approach can be beneficial for practice and further
research to derive valuable recommendations towards the
design of information networks from a risk management
perspective. Hence, our approach is the basis for the (further) development and protection of information networks
and dependent production systems.
Our developed modeling approach entails both the
challenge of gathering the necessary data by companies
and the challenge of the identification of a sensible
parametrization (e.g., security level) for accurate modeling
and simulation. In this regard, our approach can serve as a
blueprint that helps companies to identify which data they
should gather to be able to analyze availability risk of their
information network. Potential sources for these data may
include maintenance data and technical data sheets of
components, historical data, expert estimates, or reports
from IT security authorities like the German BSI. In
addition, the composition of the single modules of large,
complex smart factory information networks is time-consuming for the initial modeling. To support this, further
research could develop a formal definition for the model
composition that performs place superposition based on
corresponding labels and, thus, automates the composition
process.
Our approach is restricted to the analysis of information
network components. However, extensions such as modules for the depiction of information flows and threats that
can affect information flows (e.g., broken cables) can be
applied due to the modular approach. Further, currently,
our modeling approach can only model intentional attacks
caused by virus attacks and technical errors. Thus, further
research could develop modeling extensions to incorporate
other kinds of attacks like data leakage. Pointing into the
same direction, our approach is constrained by the defined
operational states and, thus, is not able to depict components with reduced functionality. The consideration of
different threat intensities and propagation velocities of
threats representing, for instance, the skills of an adversary
are subject to further research. Besides, the insights provided by our approach regarding IT availability risks could
be used to improve existing Unified Modeling Language
(UML) models that are suitable to visualize the structure
and behavior of the smart factory. As UML (reference)
models lack the possibility to analyze dynamic effects such
as stochastic cascading failures and propagation effects,
our modeling approach can be used as a suitable extension.
Considering that the comprehensive interconnection in
smart factories provides both positive (e.g., increased
flexibility and efficiency of production) and negative
effects (e.g., increased vulnerability to IT availability
risks), companies face the challenge of deciding whether an
extensive or deliberate interconnection of the information
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network is sensible. In this regard, the identification of the
sensible degree of interconnection in smart factories represents one of the most challenging topics. Hence, the goal
of our future research is to develop approaches and methods to determine the sensible degree of interconnection
considering risk and return aspects in different production
environments. Here, the analysis of interdependencies
between information and production networks and within
the production network is especially necessary to enable
the monetary valuation of business interruptions.
To solve this research endeavor, we see four consecutive
research areas. Based on the modeling approach presented
in the paper at hand (area 1), the identification of critical
components (area 2) within information networks represents a subsequent step for deciding on appropriate countermeasures, e.g., by means of key figures. To consider risk
and return aspects of interconnectivity and to assess the
sensible degree of interconnection in smart factories,
methods for the quantification of economic loss potentials
(area 3) and expected benefits (area 4) resulting from
extensive interconnectivity are necessary. These capabilities should empower companies to assess the sensible
degree of interconnection in information networks and to
derive adequate IT security measures.
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